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THE PART OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
MADE BY THE SUPREME COURT
HUGH E. Wmusf
T HE purpose of this article is to set forth all those parts of our
United States Constitution which have been made by the
Supreme Court, as distinguished from those parts of our Constitu-
tion which were made in the Constitutional Convention or by formal
amendments. The reason for writing such an article is to demon-
strate that a large part of our Constitution, if not the greater part
of it, has been made by the Supreme Court itself. In recent years
people in the United States have probably begun to realize that the
Supreme Court has been performing a function as a constitution
maker, but it is very doubtful if they adequately realize to what
extent the Supreme Court has been performing this function. In
writing this article, the author hopes that by having definitely set
down the various parts of the Constitution made by the Supreme
Court, the people of the country will be helped to obtain full and
accurate information on this point.
That there is a need for an article of this sort can be easily
shown. A year or two ago a president of the American Bar Asso-
ciation, in an address in Indiana, said that he did not believe in
the Constitution another man had been talking about; but he
believed in the Constitution which was made in the Constitutional
Convention presided over by George Washington, and he then
proceeded to name the constitutional principles which he found in
this Constitution. As a matter of fact, the principles thus named
by him were incorporated into our Constitution, not by the Con-
stitutional Convention but, for the most part, by formal amend-
ments. Other prominent lawyers of the United States have been
going up and down the country viewing with alarm all new changes
in our Constitution - except those that they desire. In this way
they have criticized the change in the method of selection of the
President and of senators; changes in the balance of powers between
the Federal Government and the state governments under our dual
system; changes in the balance between the legislative, executive,
t- Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
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and judicial branches of the Federal Government; changes in the
power to levy income taxes and to regulate the traffic in intoxicating
liquors. Yet parts of our Constitution which they prize the most
highly we never should have had if there had not been changes
made since the Constitutional Convention. We have laymen, as well
as lawyers, who are championing what they call a movement back
to the Constitution, but who know almost nothing about its funda-
mental principles. These people do not know what our Constitution
is, whether it is a document that was created in the Convention
once and for all or whether it is a document that has been growing
and changing up to the present moment. There are other people
who, although among the worst of the violators of constitutional
principles, volunteer to protect the Ccnstitution, as though a thing
so precious could be trusted to hands as clumsy, if not as wicked,
as these. Such facts as these show there is a need for not only a
statement as to fundamental constitutional principles, but a state-
ment as to the historical growth of these principles and the work
of the Supreme Court in connection therewith.
SOVEREIGNTY
A large part of the Constitution is devoted to the topic of
sovereignty, and upon this fundamental doctrine other doctrines
depend to a considerable extent.
Yet sovereignty was neither created nor defined by the original
Constitution. The preamble and even the main body seem to pre-
suppose it; but statesmen, jurists, philosophers, and political
scientists all differed in their opinions on the subject. Hence, it
must be assumed that the original Constitution did not create and
define this doctrine. It was created and defined by the Supreme
Court and can be found only in the decisions of that august
tribunal.1
The Supreme Court established that sovereignty in the United
States resides in the people, and not in the states nor the national
government nor the organs of government.2 The Supreme Court
I WILLis, CoNsTi'uTioNAL LAw (1936) C. I.
2 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (U. S. 17.93); Penhallow v. Doane, 3 Dall.
G4 (U. S. 1793); M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819); White
v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646 (U. S. 1871) ; Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610 (U. S. 1878);
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886).
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defined sovereignty as the power to establish law (social control)'
and held it to belong in the United States to the people as a whole,
as organized under our federal form of government, rather than
to the people of each state.4
The Supreme Court has not only established and defined the
doctrine, but it has in its decisions set forth in detail the nature
and extent of the doctrine and the implications from it. According
to the Supreme Court the sovereign people occupy the relation of
principal and all the departments and organs of government are
simply agencies of this principal. The sovereign people inherently
possess the sovereign powers of police, taxation and eminent domain.
They have delegated the exercise of these powers to various agencies
like the states and the nation and the various branches of these
governments, but the agencies to whom such powers have been
delegated cannot (except as the court has created exceptions)
redelegate these powers to other agencies.' The doctrine of the
amendability of the Constitution, of course, stems from the doctrine
of sovereignty of the people. The establishment of a new Consti-
tution by means of a revolution can be rationalized only by refer-
ring to this doctrine of sovereignty Because of this doctrine of
popular sovereignty the nature of our dual form of government
can be changed either by formal amendment or by Supreme Court
amendment so as to take from or add to the powers of either the
states or the Federal Government,7 and, of course, the powers of
the various branches of government can be changed in the same
way. The Supreme Court may even exercise a supremacy over the
other branches of the Federal Government and over the state govern-
ments on the theory that it may exercise this power as an agent
of the sovereign people and that its assumption of this power is
constitutional after acquiescence therein by the people.8
Thus it is seen that the whole topic of sovereignty is the work
of the United States Supreme Court.
3 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347, 358 (1909).
4 Leser v. Garnett, 258 U. S. 130 (1922).
5 Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892).
6 Wood's Appeal, 75 Pa. 59 (1874).
7 National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350 (1920).
8 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (U. 8. 1803) ; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
1 Wheat. 304 (U. S. 1816); Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264 (U. S. 1821).
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SUPREMACY OF THE SUPREME COURT
Another important part of the Constitution made by the Supreme
Court is that which relates to the supremacy of the Supreme Court,
or the power of judicial review. Here, the Supreme Court (1) in-
troduced into the Constitution an entirely new doctrine, (2) made
all of the law found in the doctrine, and (3) thereby remarkably
increased its own powers and by arrogating to itself the power to
determine the reasonableness of social policy, did so at the expense
of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Some have contended that the doctrine of supremacy of the
Supreme Court was introduced by the Constitutional Convention.'
But even these people have to admit that the Supreme Court
usurped the power to declare legislation unconstitutional because
unreasonable in the opinion of the majority of the justices (i. e.,
because not due process of law as a matter of substance). The fact
that they are wrong is proven by the silence of the Constitution,
by the fact that Jefferson and others interpreted this silence to
mean that either the states or the nation could decide constitutional
questions, and by the fact that at first Congress exercised legislative
supremacy. The correct view is that the Supreme Court is the sole
author of this part of the Constitution."0
In making this doctrine the Supreme Court gave itself the power
to act as an umpire between the states and the nation and between
the various branches of the national government, to decide what
powers the Constitution gives to each, to decide what limitations
the Constitution puts upon those powers, and to see that all con-
stitutional guarantees are upheld and obeyed. The result of giving
itself all of this power was that the Supreme Court gradually began
to exercise a constitution-making function, not only with respect
to its own supremacy, but with reference to doctrines put into the
Constitution by the Constitutional Convention and by formal
amendments and also with reference to new doctrines which it
desired to introduce into the Constitution itself. It thus made
itself supreme over the legislative and executive branches of the
0 Board, The Supreme Court - Usurper or Grantee (1912) 27 PoL. SO. Q. 1;
HUGHES, TnE SurnEME COURT OF THE UITED STATES (1928) 78.
10 ADAMS, TEiE LmNG JEFrERSON (1936) 289-90, 306-07, 309; ERNST, THE
ULTIATF. POWER (1937) 223, 227, 245, 261-8; WiLIS, CONSTrr0TIONAL LAw
(1936) c. IIL
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Federal Government,11 over state legislatures,' over state courts, 3
and over state executives.'4 Of course the original Constitution made
the Supreme Court supreme over the lower federal courts.
The Supreme Court has also made itself supreme over the Con-
stitution through the process of interpretation. It has sometimes
followed a rule of strict construction 5 and again a rule of liberal
construction' 6 On the question of whether the Federal Govern-
ment has a particular power, it has generally followed a rule of
strict construction.' But as to the scope of a power clearly given
the Federal Government, it has generally invoked a rule of liberal
construction. 8 The supremacy of the Supreme Court over the
Constitution has manifested itself the most strikingly as to those
parts of the Constitution which it has itself made. This exercise
of its supremacy is the subject matter of the present article. In
this activity, the Supreme Court is giving a supreme manifestation
of its supremacy.
All of this means that the Supreme Court is supreme over all
the other branches of the Federal Government and over all the
branches of the state government, not only so far as concerns the
original Constitution and the formal amendments but also so far
as concerns that part of the Constitution which it has made. The
Supreme Court can add a provision to the Constitution whenever
it desires to declare an act of legislation unconstitutional and then
can declare the legislative act a violation thereof, as it did in the
case of the A. A. A. decision. 9
The supremacy of the Supreme Court is not without limitations.
The Supreme Court has not only given itself this judicial power,
but it has put some limitations on it. Some of these limitations
11"ylton v. United States, 3 Dall. 171 (U. S. 1796); Marbury v. Madison,
1 Cranch 137 (U. S. 1803).
12 Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199 (U. S. 1796); Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87
(U. S. 1810).
1 3 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (U. S. 1816) ; Cohens v. Virginia,
6 Wheat. 264 (U. S. 1821).
14 Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378 (1932).
15 Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343 (1898); Springville City v. Thomas,
166 U. S. 707 (1897).
16 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936).
17 United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214 (1875).
'
8M'Culloeh v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
19 United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936).
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the Supreme Court was forced to put upon itself, because the
original Constitution committed their decision to another depart-
ment, or made provisions directory, or required a case or contro-
.versy for the court's jurisdiction. Other limitations the court has
put upon itself for political reasons, as in the case of the question
of what is a republican form of government. The Supreme Court
has also said that it would never exercise its supremacy unless the
unconstitutionality of some question was clear beyond a reasonable
doubt. However, when the Supreme Court holds by five to four
vote that an act of the legislature is unconstitutional beyond a doubt,
it would seem to be paying only lip service to this limitation.
This then is the part of the Constitution made by the Supreme
Court which relates to its own supremacy. Thus far we have under-
taken to set forth only the broad outlines of what the Supreme
Court has done in this part of its constitution making. For a
complete understanding of this part of the Constitution all the
other parts of the Constitution discussed in this article will have
to be understood.
.AMENDMNT
Some of that part of our Constitution which is devoted to the
topic of amendment was made by the Constitutional Convention;
the rest has been made by the Supreme Court.
The Constitutional Convention made the Constitution subject to
amendment; that is, it created a doctrine even though it did not
create the doctrine of the amendability of the Constitution. The
Constitutional Convention also provided for the general methods
whereby the Constitution may be amended. It provided that amend-
ments may be proposed either by two-thirds of both houses of
Congress or by a convention called by Congress on the application
of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states, and it provided for
the ratification of proposed amendments either by the legislatures
of three-fourths of the states or by conventions in three-fourths of
the states as Congress may choose. (In the case of equal suffrage
in the senate, ratification by the state involved as well as by the
consent of three-fourths of the states is required.)
This looks at first as though the Constitutional Convention had
written all of that part of our Consi;itution which relates to the
matter of amendment, but a study of United States Supreme Court
decisions shows the inaccuracy of this conclusion. Probably the
[VOtL. 23
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Supreme Court has made more of the doctrine of amendability
than did the Convention.
The Supreme Court has written into the Constitution that the
requirement of two-thirds of both houses of Congress means two-
thirds of a quorum. 0 It has written into the Constitution the
provision that the approval of neither the President2' nor a
governor" is necessary to the amending process; that when Con-
gress submits an amendment to state legislatures, it cannot be
ratified by conventions in the states ;' that it is illegal for a state
legislature to require a referendum on a constitutional amend-
ment ;24 that it is unnecessary for Congress, in proposing amend-
ments, to make an expressed declaration that it deems it necessary ;2
that a proposed amendment will last for ratification only a reason-
able length of time;2 that there are no implied limitations upon
amending power, either that an amendment shall be germane, or
not a grant of new power, or that it shall not be in the form of
legislation, or that it shall not destroy our dual form of govern-
ment, or that the protection of personal liberty shall not be
changed."
There are many other provisions on the subject of amendment
which ought and undoubtedly will be written into the Constitution
by the Supreme Court. Among such may be named a provision
that a state may ratify after it has rejected but may not reject
after it has ratified; a provision that Congress or a convention
may propose an entire new Constitution; a provision that Congress
may not withdraw an amendment after it has proposed it for
ratification; a provision requiring Congress to call a convention
after it has been requested to do so by the states; a provision that
the states must act together in some way in requiring the calling
of a convention; a provision that a state may provide that a
proposed amendment shall be voted on only by a legislature chosen
20 National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350 (1920).
21t Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 Dall. 378 (U. S. 1798); Hawke v. Smith,
253 U. S. 221 (1920).
22 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U. S. 355 (1932).
23 United States v. Sprague, 282 U. S. 716 (1931).
2 4 Hawke v. Smith, 253 U. S. 221 (1920).
25 National Prohibition Cases, 253 U. S. 350 (1920).
26 Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U. S. 368 (1921).
27 Leser v. Garnett, 258 U. S. 130 (1922).
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after such proposal; a provision that the power of amendment
includes the power of repeal as well as the power to change or add
to a provision; and a provision that an amendment to the Consti-
tution may be made through acquiescence for a sufficient period
of time.'
Thus it is seen that even in regard to the matter of amendment,
which is expressly provided for in the original Constitution, we
are indebted to the Supreme Court as much as we are to the Con-
stitutional Convention and the ehances are that the Court will
make a great deal more constitution upon the subject (while no
more constitution will be made by formal amendments).
SEPARATION OF POWERS
In the doctrine of separation of powers we have some of the
principal work of the Constitutional Convention. Yet, even here,
more of the Constitution has been made by the Supreme Court
than was made by the Convention.
There is no question but that the Convention created a doctrine
of separation of powers. It did not expressly say so, but by
creating three separate branches of government and by vesting in
Congress all legislative power, in the President all executive
power, and in supreme and inferior Federal Courts all judicial
power delegated to the Federal Government, the framers impliedly
created a doctrine of separation of powers.' The doctrine of
separation of powers thus created wes not a Simon pure doctrine
because it was modified by the Convention's scheme of checks and
balances, whereby, for example, it gave the judicial power of
impeachment to the legislative branch, the legislative function of
veto to the President, and the legislative treaty-making power to
the President except as the senate was given the power to advise
and consent.
The doctrine thus created by the Convention has been so worked
over by the Supreme Court that its present form bears very little
resemblance to the original. The Cou.t has gradually written into
the Constitution a reassignment of the various powers of govern-
ment by permitting the delegation of powers by the various
branches and the encroachment of one 'branch upon another and
the commingling of all the powers, but especially by its creation
28 WMLIS, CO SPTiUTioNAT. LAw (1936) C. IV.
20 1d. at 133-35.
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of its own judicial supremacy. The Supreme Court has sometimes
endeavored to uphold what was probably the original theory of
separation of powers. Thus, it has held that legislative jurisdiction
cannot be given to the Supreme Court ;"o that jurisdiction is always
a judicial question ;1 that a legislative branch of the government
cannot now reverse a judgment of a court. 2 It has also refused to
decide political questions,"3 or to enjoin or mandamus the President
or Congress because of the doctrine of separation of powers."'
Singularly, it has also held that the doctrine forbids Congress to
provide for an income tax upon the salaries of federal judges.
For the most part, however, it seems that the Supreme Court is
more concerned with breaking down the doctrine of separation of
powers than with upholding it.
As a result of the work of the Supreme Court, the Constitution
now permits Congress to delegate legislative power to the terri-
tories, 8 to delegate the power to determine conditions or con-
tingencies or to make regulations or to ascertain facts to other
branches of the government or other agencies, to delegate to
administrative tribunals or executive officers the power to ad-
minister legislative standards;7 and permits the President to
delegate administrative functions (absorbed by the executive de-
partment) to the heads of departments and subordinate officials."
The Constitution also permits the legislative and judicial branches
of the government to exercise the executive powers of appointment
and removal of officers. 9 It permits the legislative branch to
exercise the judicial functions of granting divorces," making rules
30 Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 2.61 U. S. 428 (1923).
31 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210 (1908).
82 United States v. Peters, 5 Cranch 115 (U. S. 1809).
33 Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1 (U. S. 1849).
84 Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475 (U. S. 1867).
35 Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245 (1920).
36 Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138 (1904). It should be noted that the
Supreme Court has denied to Congress the privilege of delegating its own
legislative power to the states, Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U. S.
149 (1920), or to private individuals, Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U. S. 495 (1935); Carter v. Carter Coal Company, 298 U. S. 238 (1936).
37 Hampton v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928).
3sUnited States v. Chemical Foundation Inc., 272 U. S. 1 (1926).
89 Note (1929) 42 HAnv. L. REv. 426.
4 M aynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190 (1888).
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of legal procedure,4' regulating the admission to practice and the
disbarment of attorneys,42 punishing for contempt,4 and to exercise
the executive power of pardon." It permits the judicial branch
to exercise the legislative function of judicial legislation. 5 It
permits the executive branch of the government to exercise the
judicial function of pardoning for contempt of court." It permits
an executive officer to make a finding for probable cause for arrest.47
It permits executive boards or commissions to perform quasi-judicial
functions. It permits the President to exercise the legislative power
of making treaties, to establish governments for conquered terri-
tory until legislation by Congress, 5 to wage an offensive war with-
out a declaration of war by Congress." The Constitution also now
apparently permits the commingling of all governmental powers
in one tribunal like the Interstate Commerce Commission.?
The Supreme Court has refused to enjoin or mandamus the
President or Congress,5 but it has mandamused lower Federal
executive officers and it has declared acts of both the legislative
and the executive branches unconstitutional in the exercise of its
supremacy as has heretofore been discussed.
These changes in our constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers made by the Supreme Court show that the Supreme Court
has left the three branches of government established by the
original Constitution; but has wholly remade the powers which
each may exercise, has permitted the commingling of powers, and
41 Pound, .ule Making Power of the Courtq (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 599 at 601.
42 (1929) 13 MNiN. L. Rnv. 252.
43 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (1927).
44 E Xparte United States, 242 U. S. 27 (1916).
46Loan Assn' v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 (1874). The final position of the
Supreme Court that it has the power to render declaratory judgments is not
an illustration of a change in the doctrine oE separation of powers. Nashville
Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U. S. 249 (1933).
46Ex parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87 (1925).
T Oeampo v. United States, 234 U. S. 91 (1914).
48 Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164 (U. S. 3 854).
49Putney, Executive Assumption of the Mar Making Power (1927) 7 NATL.
Uxiv. L. REV. 1.
5
°WILLis, CoxsrruTIoAL LAW (1936) 165.
I Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475 (U. S. 1867); Rees v. City of Water-
town, 19 Wall. 107 (U. S. 1873); MeChord v. Louisville & N. R. R., 183 U. S.
483 (1902).
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has established its own supremacy over the other branches of
government. To bring the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers down to date it should be reworded so as to read as follows:
The doctrine of separation of powers includes three branches of
government with the legislative and executive subject to the judi-
cial branch. Each of these branches of government may exercise
those of its own appropriate powers, which the Supreme Court has
not or the original Constitution has not given to another branch,
and any of the powers of the other branches, which the original
Constitution or the Supreme Court has given to it, but not all of
the powers of any other branch; and to some extent all of the
powers of government may be commingled in one branch of govern-
ment. 2 Hence it is seen that even in case of a doctrine put into
our Constitution by the Constitutional Convention the work of the
Court bulks larger than that of the Convention. The doctrine is
now what the Supreme Court has made it.
UNIVERSA I CITMZENS=IP AND SUFPAGE
The doctrine of universal citizenship and suffrage is less im-
portant than some others, and yet it is a fundamental part of the
United States Constitution. It has been created partly by the
original Constitution, partly by the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and
Nineteenth Amendments, and partly by the Supreme Court. We
have called the doctrine that of universal citizenship and suffrage.
The Constitution makes citizenship practically universal. Of
course, citizenship requires either birth in the United States or
naturalization here. Congress, under its power of naturalization,
has excluded from the privilege some Asiatics and a few people
who cannot fulfill certain qualifications. As a matter of fact,
suffrage is practically universal, and yet there is nothing in the
Constitution to prevent limitations on suffrage. The original Con-
stitution did not make much of our present doctrine. It recognized
citizenship, both federal and state, prescribed United States citizen-
ship as a qualification for the offices of President, Senator, and
Representative, gave Congress the power of naturalization, and
wrote into the Constitution the interstate privileges or immunities
clause, but it did not define any of these terms nor set forth the
scope of their operation.
The formal Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments
5 2 WMLIS, CONS TUTIONAL LAW (1936) e. V.
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were a little more precise than the original Constitution. The
Fourteenth Amendment defined United States citizenship to in-
elude all persons born or naturalized in the United States and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, and made state citizenship
derivative from United States citizenship. It also forbade any
state to abridge the privileges or :immunities of citizens of the
United States. But this amendment did not define its terms. The
Fifteenth Amendment gave an immunity against the United States
and the states against discrimination on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude and the Nineteenth Amendment
immunity against both as to discrimination on account of sex.
The Supreme Court, because of the paucity of the above pro-
visions in the original Constitution and amendments has had to
create most of the doctrine of universal citizenship and suffrage.
It has made the Constitution say that birth within the territory
made a person a citizen of the United States both before and after
the Fourteenth Amendment and that the Fourteenth Amendment
was, therefore, only declaratory of prior law. Prior to the Four-
teenth Amendment, however, the Supreme Court made federal
citizenship derivative from and narrower than state citizenship so
that a negro might be a citizen of a sl;ate but could not be a citizen
of the United States. 3 But after the Fourteenth Amendment the
Supreme Court has made United States citizenship primary and
paramount to state citizenship,' so that persons may be United
States citizens though not citizens of any state (like citizens of the
District of Columbia, of the territories, and those residing abroad)."
Consequently, the Supreme Court has made the Constitution say
that whites,"e negroes," and Asiatics,"8 but not Indians,' nor
nationals,60 nor corporations,6 may be citizens of the United States
by birth.
The Supreme Court has made the Constitution say that the
53 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (U. S. 1857).
4 MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299 (1915).
5 American Insurance Company v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511 (U. S. 1828).
66 MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299 (1915).
57 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 678 (1898).
;8 Ibid.
19 Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515 (U. S. 1832).
0 WmLIs, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1936) 1:34.
61Id. at 186.
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power of naturalization is the power to confer citizenship and not
a power to take it away, and hence cannot affect citizenship by
birth,"2 but that naturalization is only a privilege and not a right
so that Congress has plenary power over the subject, 3 not only to
choose those races who shall be eligible to naturalization but to
prescribe other qualifications, as, for instance, an oath to bear arms."
The Supreme Court, on the one hand, has made the Constitution
say that the immunity against the abridgement of the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States protects only those
privileges and immunities which a citizen of the United States has
because of his peculiar relation to the United States and not the
general rights, powers, privileges, and immunities of citizens. 2
Suffrage, the Supreme Court-made-Constitution says, is not a
privilege of United States citizenship," but state citizenship is a
privilege of United States citizenship.67 The Supreme Court has
made the Constitution say that this guaranty applies only against
discrimination by a states and not discrimination by a political
party.69 The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has made the
interstate privileges and immunities clause in the federal Consti-
tution include all the civil rights, powers, privileges, and immuni-
ties and to require each state to give to the citizens of other states
all such rights, powers, privileges, and immunities which it gives
to its own citizens." This guaranty, the Supreme Court has said,
does not protect aliens, negroes, citizens of a territory, Indians,
and corporations."'
The Supreme Court has made the Constitution say that the
United States has the power to deprive one of his United States
62 0Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (U. S. 1824).
63 Tutun v. United States, 270 U. S. 568 (1926).
6 4 United States v. Macintosh, 283 U. S. 605 (1931).
65 Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (U. S. 1867); Slaughter-House Cases, 16
Wall. 36 (U. S. 1872); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908). But see
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404 (1935).
66 Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162 (U. S. 1874).
67 Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1872).
6 8 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927) ; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73
(1932).
69 Grovey v. Townsend, 294 U. S. 699 (1935).
70 Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1872); Corfield v. Coryell, 6
Fed. Cas. No. 8230 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1823).
71 WVLs, Coxsi Ti NAL LAW (1936) 200.
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citizenship, 2 that a United States citizen has the privilege of ex-
patriation, 3 and that the United States has the power either to
exclude or to expel aliens who have not become United States
citizens by naturalization.
From these references to the work of the Supreme Court there
appears here another part of the United States Constitution which
owes its place in our fundamental law more to the work of the
Supreme Court than to the work of the members of the Constitu-
tional Convention or the members of Congress who formulated the
formal amendments to the Constitution which relate to this topic.
DuA FoRir oF GOVERNMENT
The Constitutional Convention probably really created a dual
form of government; though it did not create a doctrine of federal
supremacy over the states or a doctrine of Supreme Court su-
premacy over the other branches of the Federal Government and
the states. The Constitutional Convention did this at the same
time that it created a doctrine of separation of powers, and placed
limitations on state and federal powers. By giving different powers
to the three branches of the federal government and by the limi-
tations referred to, it impliedy created a dual form of government
and carried out the compromise between the small and large states.
Yet, this fact was not everywhere accepted. :Many prominent
patriots continued to hold an extreme states' rights position and
other patriots nurtured the idea of making the Federal Govern-
ment a centralized government. For this reason the doctrine of a
dual form of government was not part of our Constitution as a
legal proposition until it was written in by Chief Justice Marshall
in his celebrated opinion in the case of M'Culloch v. Marylan&'
and Gibbons v. Ogden.7" Hence, credit for the creation of this
doctrine will have to be given to the Supreme Court rather than
to the Convention. However, after the Court had created the
doctrine, the work of the Convention helped to contribute to the
making of the doctrine. The Constitutional Convention gave the
Federal Government a great many express powers, though, of
72 MacKenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299 (19.5).
73 Ibid.
7' United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253 (1905).
75 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
70 9 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1824).
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course, these powers have been interpreted by the Supreme Court,
placed important limitations on state powers, and to this extent
helped to make our dual form of government."
The doctrine of dual form of government written into our
Constitution by the Supreme Court established not two separate
sovereignties but two separate forms of government, the national
government on the one hand and the governments of the various
states on the other."8 The Supreme Court had already placed
sovereignty in the people. All that our dual form of government
means then is that there has been a division of governmental powers
between the Federal Government and the various state govern-
ments. Under this arrangement certain powers have been delegated,
either expressly or impliedly, to the Federal Government and
powers not so delegated have been either delegated to the state
governments or reserved to the people." The doctrine created by
the Supreme Court does not mean that the powers thus delegated
at one time are fixed and immutable, though they are so far as
concerns the power of various states,0 but that such division of
powers shall stand until there has been a re-division of powers
through an exercise of the formal power of amendment in the
original Constitution or the informal power of amendment exer-
cised by the Supreme Court.8 However, the Supreme Court has
limited our dual form of government to domestic relations. It has
written into our Constitution that there is no dual form of govern-
ment as to our foreign relations.8
In order to draw the line more accurately between federal power
on the one hand and state power on the other, the Supreme Court,
in addition to limiting the powers of either or both these govern-
ments, has written into the Constitution further implied limitations
resulting from the doctrine of federal supremacy. It has made it
a part of the Constitution that the Tenth Amendment is not a
limitation on implied powers, and that limitations in the original
77 WILLIS, CoNsTITuTIoN~A LAw (1936) ce. VII-XVI.
7 8 M 'Culloeh v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819); Gibbons v. Ogden,
9 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1824).
78 Martin v. Runter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (U. S. 1816).
80 Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700 (U. S. 1868).
81 WILLIS, CoNsTiTUTIoNAL LAW (1936) 206.
82 United States v. Curtis Wright Co., 299 U. S. 304 (1937).
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Constitution and the formal amendments in favor of individuals
do not affect the doctrine of dual form of government since they
do not disturb the relative balance of powers between the states
and the Federal Government but only the relative balance between
individuals and these governments.
As a part of the doctrine of dual form of government, the
Supreme Court has created the doctrine of the immunity of federal
agencies83 from state taxation, police, and eminent domain powers,
and the immunity of state agencies from similar exercises of power
by the Federal Government; but in the application of its doctrine
to specific cases the Supreme Court has rendered such inconsistent
decisions and in upholding its doctrine of federal supremacy it
has permitted so many encroachments upon state power by the
Federal Government and has so favored the Federal Government
over the states that a great deal of uncertainty in constitutional
law has thus been created." However, the Supreme Court has
made the Constitution forbid the delegation of federal power to
the states or the delegation of states' powers to the Federal
Government."3
The Supreme Court has gradually modified the doctrine of the
dual form of government so as to make it include the doctrine of
federal supremacy"5 and under this doctrine has permitted the
encroachments on state powers by the Federal Government and
favored the Federal Government as against state governments, as
has heretofore been noted. The Court has not only made the
doctrine of the dual form of govermnent subject to the doctrine
of federal supremacy but also subject to the doctrine of judicial
supremacy so that the Court may declare unconstitutional an act
83 M'Culloeh v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819); Weston v. City of
Charleston, 2 Pet. 449 (U. S. 1829); Collector v. Day, 11 Wall. 113 (U. S. 1870).
8 4 WILLIS, CoNsTITuTIoNAL LAw (1936) 228-48.
83 Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U. S. 1852).
86 Houston, E. & W. Teax. Ry. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342 (1914) (Shreve-
port Rate Cases); Railroad Commission of Wisconsin v. Chicago B. & Q. By.,
257 U. S. 563 (1922); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (1920); Selective
Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (1918). However, in the first child labor case,
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918), and the A. A. A. case, United
States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936), the Supreme Court seemed to reverse this
doctrine and establish a doctrine of state supremacy; but the case of National
Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937),
has apparently restored the doctrine of federal supremacy.
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of a state legislature, 7 enjoin a governorP and make the state
courts inferior courts in the federal system.89
Of course the Supreme Court has created no express powers for
the Federal Government but it has decided whether such powers
are exclusive0 or concurrent." And the Supreme Court has given
the Federal Government all sorts of implied powers like the power
to incorporate a bank,9" the power to issue legal tender notes,93 the
power to take land by eminent domain,' the power to punish
officers of elections at which representatives are chosen,95 the power
to prohibit the manufacture and sale of non-intoxicants, the
power to establish farm loan banks, 7 the power to pass an employer's
liability act,9" the power to abolish gold clauses in private and
public contracts,99 and the power to construct dams and to sell
surplus electric energy and to buy transmission lines to market.'0 9
The Supreme Court, -however, has held that the United States has
no inherent powers in the case of internal affairs,1"' although it has
given Congress a number of resulting powers.0 2
Nowhere has the function of the Supreme Court as a constitution-
maker been better exemplified than in connection with the express
87 Ware v. Hylton, 3 DalL 199 (U. S. 1796) ; Pletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87
(U. S. 1810).
88 Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U. S. 378 (1932).
89 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304 (U. S. 1816); Cohens v. Virginia,
6 Wheat. 264 (U. S. 1821); Ableman v. Booth, 21 How. 506 (U. S. 1859);
Clafin v. Houseman, 93 U. S. 130 (1876).
90 Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122 (U. S. 1819).
9
'United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377 (1922).
9 2 M 'Culloeh v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 (U. S. 1819).
93Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1870); Juillard v. Greenman,
110 U. S. 421 (1884).
94United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry., 160 U. S. 668 (1896).
9 5Ez parte Siebold, 100 U. S. 371 (1879).
96 luppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264 (1920).
97 Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U. S. 180 (1921).
9 8 Second Employer's Liability Cases, 223 U. S. 1 (1912).
9 9 Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry., 294 U. S. 240 (1935); Perry v. United
States, 294 U. S. 330 (1935).
3
0 0 Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288 (1936).
10' Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1907). Compare as to external affairs,
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U. S. 304 (1936).
102 Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1870).
IOWFA LAW B.3VIEW
powers given the Federal Government in the original Constitution
and with the express limitations on state powers in this document.
The powers alluded to are very extensive both in number and scope;
they are set forth in express language in the original written
document and yet their meaning today is just what the Court has
given to them.
New States. The original Constitution gave Congress the power
to admit new states into the union provided it did not undertake
to form a new state within the jurisdiction of another state or form
a new state by the junction of two or more states without the
consent of the legislatures of the states. But the Supreme Court
had to write into the Constitution that this express power did not
give Congress any power over the status of the states after their
admission.'
New Territory. The original Constitution gave Congress the
power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations
respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United
States but the Supreme Court held that this power related only to
the original Northwest Territory.Y The original Constitution did
not give the Federal Government power to acquire any territory,
to incorporate any territory acquired, nor to govern any other
territory than the original Northwest Territory. The Supreme
Court, however, has given the Federal Government the power to
acquire new territory, implying this power from the treaty power,
the war power, and its complete cofitrol over our foreign relations."5
The power to incorporate new territory acquired either by treaty
or by act of Congress has been implied from the power to acquire ;'
and the power to govern newly acquired territory has been implied
from the necessities of the case.'07 The Supreme Court has also
written into the Constitution that the original laws of annexed
territory continue to apply until they have been changed either by
congressional or executive action,0" and that so far as the states
103 Coyle v. Smith, 221 U. S. 559 (1911).
104 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (U. S. 1857).
10 5 American Insurance Company v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511 (U. S. 1828) ; Downes
v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244 (1901); Jones v. Uited States, 137 U. S. 202 (1890).
100 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244 (1901).
107 De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 1 (1901).
108 The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158 (1903); Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244
U. S. 205 (1917).
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of the union are concerned all constitutional prohibitions on the
Federal Government apply."°  So far as annexed territory incor-
porated is concerned all constitutional prohibitions apply except
those limited to the states-;'I so far as annexed territory unin-
corporated is concerned constitutional prohibitions limited to the
states, which apply within the United States and the general
artificial prohibitions do not apply;' so far as concerns territory
temporarily occupied only the absolute prohibitions apply;' and
so far as concerns territory within the limits of a foreign country
only the absolute prohibitions apply 1
Treaties. The original Constitution gave the President and the
Senate a joint power to make treaties provided two-thirds of the
senators present concur. But it has been necessary for the Supreme
Court to make this power greater than the legislative power of
Congress"4 and not limited by our doctrine of a dual form of
government."5  However, the Supreme Court has made the Con-
stitution say that a treaty may be repealed by an act of Congress
as an act of Congress may be repealed by a treaty. 6 The Supreme
Court should write into the Constitution a provision either granting
or denying Congress this power where it has no coordinate juris-
diction over the subject matter of the treaty.
Military Power. The original Constitution gave to Congress and
the President the power to declare and wage war, the power to
raise and support armies and navies and to call out the state
militia, and the power to provide for the government of the army,
the navy, and the militia. But the Court has made the Constitution
say that the President may recognize the existence of a state of
war;' that a President may not," though a governor probably
109 Coyle v. Smith, 221 U. S. 559 (1911).
110 Territory of Alaska v. Troy, 258 U. S. 101 (1922).
111 Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138 (1904).
"1 'Neely v. Henkel, 180 U. S. 109 (1901).
Is In re Ross, 140 U. S. 453 (1891).
14 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U. S. 416 (1920).
15 Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678 (1887); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Co., 299 U. S. 304 (1936).
116 Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580 (18.4).
"17 Prize Cases, 2 Black 635 (U. S. 1862).
318z arte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1866).
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may,' declare martial law; that a war may be terminated by a
treaty of peace as well as an act of Congress ;12 that Congress has
implied from the military powers the power to pass a selective
draft law;11 that Congress may provide for service over seas;'
and that prohibition will not lie against a court martial." But the
Court has not as yet made the Constitution tell us whether the
President or Congress has the right 1;o suspend the writ of habeas
corpus.1
24
Taxation. The original Constitution gave Congress a general
power of taxation but it placed certain prohibitions and limi-
tations on Congress, and the Court has placed other limitations
and has interpreted or modified the express provisions in the
original Constitution. The original document expressly provided
that "no tax or duties shall be laid on articles exported from any
state". The Court has made this clause read "exported to a foreign
country". 5 The original Constitution expressly provided that
"all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States". The Court has made this read "geographical
uniformity"." The original Constitution expressly provided that
"no capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be paid unless in Propor-
tion to the Census". The Court has had to write into the Constitu-
tion what taxes are direct. It at first made the Constitution say
that an income tax is not a direct tax," but more recently it has
made the Constitution say that an income tax is a direct tax's and
after passage of the Sixteenth Amendment it still made the Con-
stitution read that a tax on stock dividends is a direct tax.' 9 The
original Constitution granted to Congress the "Power to lay and
119 Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78 (1909).
120 But see Corwin, The Power of Congress ;to Declare Peace (1920) 18 MtoH.
L. Rnv. 669.
121 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (1918).
122 Cox v. Woods, 247 U. S. 3 (1918).
123 Smith v. Whitney, 116 U. S. 167 (1886).
124 EX parte Milligan, 4 Wall 2 (U. S. 1863).
125 Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123 (U. S. 1868); Dooley v. United States,
182 U. S. 222 (1901);
120 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 (1900).
127 Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 586 (1881).
128 PoIlock v. Farmers L. & T. Co., 158 U. E;. 601 (1895).
120 Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189 (1920).
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collect Taxes", and "to pay the Debts, and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States". But the
Court had to make this mean not a grant of police power but a
limitation on the power of taxation; and that as such limitation it
gives the Federal Government a broad power of taxation and limits
the power no more than due process of law does.3 The limitations
which the Court has made the Constitution put upon the Federal
Government's taxing power are that taxation must be for a public
purpose (through its general limitation of due process as a matter
of substance) ;1 that federal taxation must not be class legislation
(because of due process as a matter of substance) ;... probably that
federal taxation must not impair the obligation of contracts (because
of due process as a matter of substance) ;... that the federal taxing
power must not be used to interfere with the state's police power
(so as to violate our dual form of government) ;'3 and even that
the Federal Government cannot levy income taxes on the salaries
of federal judges.' The Court has made the Sixteenth Amend-
ment permit the Federal Government to levy income taxes on the
basis of citizenship... and has defined income;37 has made the
original Constitution permit Congress to levy an estate tax,18 gift
taxes,' and other excise taxes. 4 "
Money. The original Constitution gave Congress the power "to
coin Money, regulate the Value thereof and of foreign Coin" and
"to provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities
and current Coin of the United States". The Court has added
that Congress has the power to issue bills of credit ;' the power to
130 United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936).
131 Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312 (1932).
132 Ibid.
1'3 United States v. Northern Pac. Ry., 256 U. S. 51 (1921).
184 United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936) ; but compare Chas. C. Steward
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 300 U. S. 652 (1937).
135 Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245 (1920).
236 Cook v. Tait, 265 U. S. 47 (1924).
137 Brown v. Helvering, 291 U. S. 193 (1934).
'35 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 (1900).
189 Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U. S. 124 (1929).
140 Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107 (1911).
141 Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603 (U. S. 1869).
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make its own notes legal tender;42 the power to override the gold
clauses in private contracts ;" and the power to ban gold hoarding.'
Bankruptcy. The original Constitution gave Congress the power
to establish "uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies, through-
out the United States". The Court has written into the Constitu-
tion that this is an unlimited power;4. that Congress and state
legislatures have a concurrent power;' that a federal bankruptcy
law supersedes a state insolvency law. 47 But the Constitution is
even yet silent as to whether a bankruptcy law violates the obliga-
tion of contracts as applied to contracts already made. 48
Postal Power. The original Constitution gave Congress the
power "to establish Post Offices and post Roads" but the Court has
written into the Constitution that Congress, under the postal power,
has the power to exclude matter from the United States mails so
long as its action is by due process of law, 49 and the power to
prevent obstructions of the United States mail.'
Patents and Copyrights. The original Constitution gave Congress
the power to issue patents to inventors and copyrights to authors.
But the Supreme Court has defined the nature of the rights of a
patentee and of an author ;.. and has given the states the power
of taxation of royalties from patents.'52
Elections. The original Constitution gave Congress the power to
be judge over the election of its own members but provided that
"the Times, Places, and Manner of holding Elections for Senators
and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legis-
lature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or
alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators".
142 Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (U. S. 1870); Julliard v. Greenman,
110 U. S. 421 (1884).
14 Norman v. Balitimore and Ohio Ry., 294 U. S. 240 (1935); Nortz v.
United States, 294 U. S. 317 (1935); Perry v. United States, 294 U. S. 330
(1935).
144 Ibid.
140 Matter of Klein, 1 How. 277 (U. S. 1843).
'L4 Sturgis v. Crowinshield, 4 Wheat. 122 (U. S. 1819).
147 Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U. S. 181 (1902).
L4B. g., Canada Southern R. 1. v. Gebhard, 109 U. S. 527 (1883).
1 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 727 (1877).
00 it re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895).
151 Wheaten v. Peters, 8 Pet. 591 (U. S. 1834).
"0 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U. S. 123 (1932).
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The Court has made the Constitution give Congress the power to
protect the election of its members from corruption and violence.
and the power to prevent corruption in the election of electors,'
but has held that Congress has no power over primary elections.'
Commerce. The original Constitution gave Congress the power
"to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes". This grant of an
important, specific police power occupies only a few words in the
original Constitution but the commerce power that the Court has
written into the Constitution occupies many pages.
The Court has made the Constitution say that the power of
Congress over foreign commerce is not limited by due process of
law as a matter of substance56 but that the power of Congress
over interstate commerce is so limited by due process of law.'
The Court has made the Constitution say what is commerce and
what is not. At first it made the Constitution say that it included
transportation as well as traffic5 8 and that transportation included
transportation of persons as well as goods5 and the sending of
telegrams.' Then it apparently changed the wording of the
Constitution so that commerce did not include traffic but only
transportation.161 But once again the Court seems now to be
making the Constitution say that commerce includes traffic as well
as transportation.- 2 Yet even under this definition the Court has
153 E parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S. 651 (1884).
15 Burroughs v. United States, 290 U. S. 534 (1934).
' Newberry v. United States, 256 U. S. 232 (1921).
156 The Abby Dodge, 223 U. S. 166 (1912).
'157 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312 (1893).
158 Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1824).
159 Gloucester Ferry v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196 (1885).
160 Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1 (1878).
161 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918); United States v. E. C.
Knight Co., 156 U. S. 1 (1895); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U. S. 495 (1935); Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. R., 295 U. S. 330
(1935).
1620 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936). This position is also
supported by cases holding that a sale of tangibles while still in the original
package in transportation is interstate commerce, Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S.
100 (1890); by cases holding that contracts for advertising may be interstate
commerce, Indiana Farmers Guide Pub. Co. v. Prairie Farmer Pub. Co., 293
U. S. 268 (1934), and by cases holding that walking and driving may be inter-
state commerce, Covington Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204 (1894).
IOWA LAW .EVIEW
not settled the question of whether, without transportation, a mere
sale of either tangibles or intangibles or the making of insurance
and other contracts between people in different states may amount
to interstate commerce.8 3
It has made the Constitution say that commerce becomes inter-
state whenever there is traffic between people in different states
or the transportation of goods from one state to another state;
and that commerce ceases to be interstate commerce when traffic
or transportation is over but that this does not occur until the
original package has been delivered and there has been one sale
or the original package has been broken;1"1 or until goods to be
assembled have been so assembled ;16' or until the pressure or voltage
of gas or electricity transmitted has been stepped down. 7
It made the Constitution say that the police power over inter-
state commerce was, up to 1851, a concurrent power of the states
and the Federal Government;1' between 1851 and 1894, an ex-
clusive power of the Federal Government, where the interstate
commerce was national in scope and needed one uniform method
of regulation"9 (though otherwise the power continued to be con-
current), o and the states could not exercise their general police
power either directly or indirectly; 72 after 1894, still an exclusive
power of Federal Government, as it had been held between 1851
and 1894, but now it was held to be subject to the general police
183 WILLIS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw (1936) 283-85.
184Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat 1 (U. S. 1824). Thus the soliciting by
drummers of orders for goods to be shiped from another state, Real Silk
Hosiery AM v. City of Portland, 268 U. 1. 25 (1925), and even a bailment
of grain ultimately to be shipped to other states, Lemke v. Farmers' Grain
Company of Embden, North Dakota, 258 Th S. 50 (1922), is interstate com-
merce.
205 Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. R. R., 125 U. S. 507 (1888); May v. New
Orleans, 178 U. S. 496 (1900). This rule was first announced in reference to
foreign commerce, Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (U. S. 1827), and was
extended to interstate commerce, Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343 (1900).
168 York Mfg. Co. v. Colley, 247 U. S. 21 (1918).
187 East Ohio Gas Co. v. Tax Commission of Ohio, 283 U. S. 465 (1931).
18 Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. 245 (U. S. 1829).
160 Cooley v. Board of Port Wardens, 12 How. 299 (U. S. 1851).
'
70 Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713 (U. S. 1865).
171 Hannibal and St. Joseph Ry. v. Husext, 95 U. S. 465 (1878); Leisy v.
Hardin, 135 U. S. 100 (1890); Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U. S. 47 (1891).
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power of the states, so that the states might indirectly regulate
interstate commerce." 2 The Court has said that a state, in the
exercise of its police power, may forbid the shipment of wild
animals..3 and running water 74 from the state, though it may not
retain other natural resources,' and that a state may exclude
articles76 or personsl77 if necessary to protect social interests of
the state; but that a state cannot indirectly regulate interstate
commerce except to protect paramount social interests7 and those
of its own people, 79 nor violate other constitutional limitations,"8 "
nor establish regulations in conflict with federal regulations.'
The Court has said that the commerce clause gives the Federal
Government police power over the persons and instrumentalities
engaged in interstate commerce ;..2 over the goods carried in inter-
state commerce, so as to permit and regulate their transportation
and even to prohibit the shipment of goods in interstate commerce,
either absolutely,8 3 or on condition ;-' and to regulate persons or
172 Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461 (1894); New York, New Haven
& Hartford Ry. v. New York, 165 U. S. 628 (1897); Lake Shore & Mich. &
Ry. v. Ohio, 173 U. S. 285 (1899) ; Rasmussen v. Idaho, 181 U. S. 198 (1901);
In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 (1891); Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431 (1936);
Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 301 U. S. 608 (1937).
'73 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S. 519 (1896).
174 Hudson County v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349 (1908).
175 Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 (1923).
176 Plumley v. Massachusetts, 155 U. S. 461 (1894).
177 Compagnie v. State Board, 186 U. S. 380 (1902).
'
7 8 Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313 (1890); Sehollenberger v. Pennsyl-
vania, 171 U. S. 1 (1898); Cleveland, Cin., Chi., & St. Louis By. v. Illinois,
177 U. S. 514 (1900).
179 Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U. S. 163 (1928); Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig,
294 U. S. 511 (1935).
180 Denver & Rio Grande W. R. R. v. Terte, 284 U. S. 284 (1932).
'
8 l McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U. S. 115 (1913).
18 2 Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U. S. 211 (1899);
Southern Ry. v. United States, 222 U. S. 20 (1911); Second Employers' Liability
Cases, 223 U. S. 1 (1912); of. Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. R., 295
U. S. 330 (1935).
183 Lottery Cases, 188 U. S. 321 (1903); Hip olite Egg Co. v. United States,
220 U. S. 45 (1911); Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308 (1913); of. Hammer
v. Dagenhart, 247 U. S. 251 (1918).
184 Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U. S. 31 (1917); Kentucky
Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois C. R., 299 U. S. 334 (1937).
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things obstructing or burdening interstate commerce, 85 if in all
such cases there is sufficient social interest to make its action due
process of law."
The Supreme Court has made the Constitution say that the states
cannot tax the privilege of doing interstate commerceT nor goods
or persons while they are moving in interstate commerce,"s but that
they may tax persons for the privilege of doing state business even
though such persons are also engaged in interstate business;"9
and that they may tax tangible goo& carried by a company when
they are at rest before transportation has begun, 9 ' when they are
at rest during transportation, 0 and when at rest after transporta-
tion has ended."2 The Court has permitted the states to levy an
excise tax on peddlers for peddling goods shipped in interstate
commerce, 3 but it has not permitted them to levy an excise tax
on drummers for selling goods to be shipped in interstate com-
merce. "' The Court has also permitted the states to levy taxes on
the property of companies engaged in interstate commerce, whether
on land,0 5 or tangibles,9 or intangibles,"0 and has also permitted
a net income tax on domestic corporal;ions on income derived from
interstate commerce;"0 but it does nob permit a net income tax on
r5 e Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895); Southern Ry. v. United States, 222
U. S. 20 (1911); Houston & Tex. By. v. United States (Shreveport Rate Cases),
234 U. S. 342 (1914); National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 (1937).
86 5 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312 (1893).
1
' Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (1888); Alfred Portland Cement
Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203 (1925).
18' Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 2432 (U. S. 1872) ; Passenger Cases,
7 How. 283 (U. S. 1849).
189 Edelman v. Boeing Air Transport Inc., 289 U. S. 249 (1933).
' 
0 Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123 (U. S. 1868); Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S.
517 (1886).
101 Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S. 1 (1933).'
102 Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622 (1885); Hinson v. Lott, 8 Wall. 148
(U. S. 1869).
103 Howe Machine Company v. Gage, 100 U. S. 676 (1879); Emert v. Mis-
souri, 156 U. S. 296 (1895); of. Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 (1875).
104 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489 (1887).
195 Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 1:14 U. S. 196 (1885).
10 Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvaitla, 141 U. S. 18 (1891).
197 Virginia v. Imperial Coal Sales Co., 293 U. S. 15 (1934).
103 United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 (1918).
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foreign corporations on income derived from interstate commerceeP"
nor a gross income tax on either domestic corporations or foreign
corporations."' 0 The Supreme Court has been allowing more latitude
for state taxation and there is a possibility that in the course of
time it may allow a state not only to tax interstate commerce and
the privilege of doing interstate commerce but also to tax instru-
mentalities of the Federal Government, with the reciprocal federal
taxation of instrumentalities of the state, provided that the taxes
are nondiscriminatory. Such taxes would not interfere with the
operation of either form of government and would afford much
additional revenue.2"' Of course the Supreme Court will hold that
the Federal Government has the power to tax interstate commerce,
but it has not as yet written this into the Constitution."2
Full Faith and Credit. The original Constitution provided that
"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other state" but
the Supreme Court had to write into the Constitution that the
requirement applies only to civil judgments0 3 and statutes,' not
to contracts," 5 nor to matters of procedure,"4 nor to foreign judg-
ments ;20T but that the states must give full faith and credit to
judgments of federal courts,20 ' and the federal courts must give
full faith and credit to state judgments ;" and that a state has no
option as to whether or not to give full faith and credit."0 How-
199 Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 268 U. S.
203 (1925).
200 Philadelphia & S. Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326 (1887);
Fisher's Blend Station Inc. v. Tax Commission of Washington, 296 U. S. 650
(1936).
2o Cf. Storen v. J. D. Adams Mfg. Co., 7 N. E. (2d) 941 (Ind. 1937).
202 See Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v. United States, 289
U. S. 48 (1933).
2 03 Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U. S. 1 (1885).
2 0 4 John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Yates, 299 U. S. 178 (1936).
2 05 National Mutual B. & L. Ass'n v. Braham, 193 U. S. 635 (1904).
200 Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. v. Sowers, 213 U. S. 55 (1909).
20
T Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Tremblay, 223 U. S. 185 (1912).
2 08 Claflin v. Horseman, 93 U. S. 130 (1876).
200 Bradford Elee. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145 (1932). So the
District of Columbia must give full faith and credit to a judgment of the state.
Mils v. Duryee, 7 Cranch 481 (U. S. 1813).
210Roche v. McDonald, 275 U. S. 449 (1928).
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ever, it has made the Constitution say that for a judgment to be
entitled to the protection of the full :.aith and credit clause, a court
must have jurisdiction over the person or the subject matter.2"
Compacts. The original Constitution, in a left-handed way, gave
the states the power to enter into a compact by providing "no State
shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agree-
ment or Compact with another State or with a foreign Power".
The Supreme Court has apparently made the Constitution prohibit
compacts with a foreign country which amount to treaties." The
intent of the Constitutional Convention was probably to confine
compacts between states to questions of boundary lines and matters
connected therewith, but the Court has given this provision a
broader meaning."'
Extradition. The original Constitution provided that "a Person
charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who
shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall, on
Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he
fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Juris-
diction of the Crime." This provision seems to indicate that the
Constitution places a legal duty upon the governor of the state of
the asylum, but the Supreme Court has held that mandamus will
not lie to compel a governor to extradite a fugitive from justice."
The Court has also made the Constitution say that a state has no
power to extradite a person to a foreign country;21 that the remedy
of habeas corpus is available for a person to test the legality of
extradition proceedings;"16 that if a fugitive is kidnapped no
process is available to return him to the state of asylum ; that a
person extradited for a crime may be tried for any other offenses
with which the demanding state may charge him ;218 and that the
211 D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. 165 (U. S. 1850); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S.
714 (1877); Flexner v. Farson, 248 U. S. 289 (1919).
212 Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 540 (U. S. 1840).
213 Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1823); North Dakota v. Minnesota,
263 U. S. 365 (1923).
214 Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (U. S. 1860).
215 United States v. Rauseher, 119 U. S. 407 (1886).
210 Ex parte Royall, 117 U. S. 241 (1886).
217 Mahon v. Justice, 127 U. S. 700 (1888).
218 Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U. S. 537 (1893).
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constitutional provisions give legislative power to Congress on the
subject. 9
Thus, it is seen again that that part of our present Constitution
which relates to our dual form of government is for the most part
the work of the Supreme Court. The doctrine of a dual form of
government is just what the Court has made it. It has fixed the
powers of the states and the powers of the nation. We have already
referred to some questions involving our dual form of government
which the Court has not as yet answered so as to make a Consti-
tution upon those subjects. There are other questions on which
the Supreme Court has not as yet written answers into the Con-
stitution. For example, the Court has not as yet told us whether
or not a state has the power to levy a sales tax on goods sold to
persons in another state or to be shipped into another state. Un-
doubtedly, sometime in the future the Supreme Court will write
further provisions into our Constitution upon such subjects.
PROTECTION op PERsoNAL LIBERTY AGAINST SOCIAL CONTROL
The greatest and most significant part of our Constitution is
concerned with the protection of personal liberty against social
control, either by the Federal Government or by the States or by
both. Very little of this part of our Constitution is found in the
original document, the only provisions relating to it being found
in Article I, Sections 9 and 10; personal liberty was not a problem
in the Constitutional Convention. Much more of this part of our
Constitution is found in the formal amendments. All of the formal
amendments except the 10th, 11th, 12th, 17th, and 20th relate to
this subject. But almost all of this part of our Constitution is
found in the decisions of the Supreme Court scattered through the
pages of the 302 volumes of the reports of the United States
Supreme Court. In making this Constitution, the Court has some-
times rewritten the guaranties and limitations found in the original
Constitution and the formal amendments and sometimes has written
into the Constitution limitations and guaranties never there before.
At first there was some question whether or not the first ten
amendments, constituting the Bill of Rights, were limitations only
upon the Federal Government's action or upon the action of the
States as well. The Supreme Court settled this question by making
them merely limitations on federal action.220
219 Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U. S. 80 (1885).
22 0Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 (U. S. 1833).
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Guaranties of the First Amendment. The First Amendment
provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof"; and
Article VI of the original Constitution provides "but no religious
Test shall ever be required as a QuaLfication to any Office or public
Trust under the United States". ]M any religionists have thought
that the guaranty of religious liberty in the First Amendment as
well as in Article VI of the original Constitution was a guaranty
in the broad sense so that they could do whatever their religion
permitted or required. The Supreme Court has made the guaranty
mean a very different thing. According to the Suprdme Court the
guaranty does not protect against unsocial conduct like the refusal
of medical aid.2 ' It only protects against the establishment of a
state religion and against the requirement of a religious test for
office."
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of s-peech, or of the press." This
might have been treated as a general guaranty of freedom of speech
and of the press against the Federal Government, and, by inclusion
in the due process clause, against state governments. The Supreme
Court, however, has made it a guaranty of freedom only (1) against
censorship,"' and (2) against liability for publications, including
those which cannot be censored, unless such liability is imposed in
a proper exercise of the police power.224
The First Amendment also provide s that "Congress shall make
no law . . . abridging . . . the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances." Many people may innocently believe that this guaranty
means just what it says but under administrative practice people
have been able to obtain very little protection from this guaranty
or similar guaranties in state constitutions and the Supreme Court
has not restored any greater protection to the guaranty. 5
221 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1879).
222 Meyer v. State of Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923).
223 For certain exceptions see Near v. Mi2esota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931).
224 This occurs where liability is imposed for old crimes and for new crimes
when the words spoken or written have a clear and present danger of giving
rise to unlawful acts. Schenck v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919); Strom-
berg v. California, 283 U. S. 359 (1931); ]terndon v. Lowry, 301 U. S. 242
(1937).
22 5 WmLIS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1936) 506-07.
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Privilege to Bear Arms. The Second Amendment provides that
"A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed." The Supreme Court has decided that there is here no
guaranty of the personal liberty to bear arms, but only a protection
of the personal liberty to bear arms in a militia in order to protect
our political institutions against the danger of a standing army.
Quartering Soldiers. The guaranty in the Third Amendment
against the quartering of soldiers is one which the Supreme Court
has not rewritten. -Whatever protection of personal liberty it gives
has not been changed.
Treason, Habeas Corpus, Etc. The original Constitution provides
that "Treason against the United States shall consist only in levy-
ing War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them
Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason, unless
on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on
Confession in open Court . . . no Attainder of Treason shall work
Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture, except during the Life of the
Person attainted." The Supreme Court has held that to levy war
a person must make direct effort to overthrow the government. A
mere enrollment of men is not enough."' It has held that to adhere
to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort, one must be guilty
of acts indicating disloyalty to tiis country and sympathy with the
enemy, and must directly further their hostile designs; his motives
are irrelevant." However, it permits the punishment of many acts
as sedition which but for the constitutional protection might be
punished as treason.29 The Supreme Court has not added or taken
away from the meaning of the guaranty against passage of bills of
attainder except that it has made it include bills of pains and
penalties." 9 The Court, in interpreting the guaranty of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, has said that this writ is available
either where a person has been imprisoned for a crime or for an
offense not known by the law."' Chief Justice Taney expressed the
opinion that Congress rather than the President possesses the power
226 Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252 (1886).
22 7 BX parte Bollman, 4 Oranch 75 (U. S. 1807).
228 Hanauer v. Doane, 12 Wall. 342 (U. S. 1870).
229 Sehenek v. United States, 249 U. S. 47 (1919).
230 'Z parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333 (U. S. 1867).
2
3
1 Henry v. Henkel, 235 U. S. 219 (1914).
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to suspend the writ."2 The Court has held that the writ cannot
be suspended in a state where the civil courts are in full operation
and the Federal Government is unopposed."3 Otherwise this
guaranty remains unchanged.
Unreasonable Searches and Seizures. The Fourth Amendment
provides that "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated." The Supreme Court has held
that there is no search or seizure under this guaranty when
officials open letters written in a penitentiary,"4 or use a search
light,23 or tap a telephone wire,23 but that a subpoena duces tecum
may come within the guaranty 7 and that a corporation is pro-
teeted.238 It has said that a search arid seizure is reasonable where
according to the common law it was legal to search and seize with-
out a warrant and with a warrant, but that searches and seizures
are unreasonable if they amount to writs of assistance, general
warrants, or any other enterprises or expeditions not recognized
by the common law as reasonable.239
Rights in JudiciaZ Proceedings. In. the Fifth Amendment there
is a provision that "No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." A casual reading
of this guaranty might lead one to think that it means protection
only to the accused in a criminal proceeding. The Supreme
Court, however, has extended the protection to witnesses, against
every branch of the government 4 ' and as to testimony in any
proceeding when it can be used in that jurisdiction in a later
criminal prosecution,24 and even to protection against the produc-
tion of books and papers.2" By a strange coupling of the Fourth
Amendment to the Fifth, the Court also makes the guaranty protect
232 EX parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. No. 9,487 (C. C. Md. 1861).
2 33 E parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U. S. 1866).
2 34 Stroud v. United States, 251 U. S. 15 (1919).
235 United States v. Lee, 274 U. S. 559 (1927).
230 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 428 (1928).
237 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906).
238 Ibid.
2 3 WmLis, CoNsTr1umoNL LAW (1936) 533-37.
2 4 0 Counselman v. Hiteheock, 142 U. S. 547 (1892).
,41 Ibid.
242 Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886).
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against the use as evidence of papers and effects seized illegally."'
It has refused to give the benefits of the guaranty to corporations.2"
It has failed to make it protect against third-degree coercion, com-
pulsory medical examination of parts of the body usually exposed
to view, finger prints, lie-detector tests, and the exhibition of body
and clothes.245
The Fifth Amendment provides, among other things, that no
person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb." This guaranty in the Constitution
says so little that it has required much more to be said by the
Supreme Court. The clause is probably applicable to all indictable
offenses, including misdemeanors. 248 The Court has decided that,
with certain exceptions,24 jeopardy occurs not when a person has
been found guilty but after -a valid indictment or information,
arraignment, plea, and impanelment and swearing of the jury;2
and that there is double jeopardy only where the second prose-
cution is for the same offense as the first and within the same
jurisdiction.249 The allowance of exemplary damages in a civil
suit in addition to criminal punishment is probably not double
jeopardy.25
One clause in the Fifth Amendment provides "No person shall
be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentation or indictment of a Grand Jury" (except in
certain military cases). The Supreme Court has held that there is
an infamous crime when there is punishment by imprisonment in
a penitentiary or at hard labor in any place,25 but it has left in
doubt whether other punishments such as the loss of political privi-
leges indicate infamous crimes." 2 It has also held that a grand
jury must be constituted like a common-law grand jury as to its
number, secrecy, and impartiality."3
243 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920).
244 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1906).
245 WILLIS, CONsTmTuTioTAL LAw (1936) 521-24.
246 Berkowitz v. United States, 93 Bed. 452 (C. 0. A. 3d, 1890).
24 7 WILLIs, CONSTiTUiONAL LAw (1936) 529.
248 United States v. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310 (1892).
249 United States v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377 (1922).
250 WILLIS, CoNSTITUT oNAL LAw (1936) 530.
251 United States v. Moreland, 258 U. S. 433 (1922).
252 See Hunter v. United States, 272 Fed. 235 (C. C. A. 4th, 1921).
255 Martin v. Texas, 200 U. S. 316 (1906).
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The original Constitution providesz for trial by jury, within the
state where committed, of all crimes except in cases of impeach-
ment. The Sixth Amendment provides for a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime was committed in case of all criminal prosecutions. The
Seventh Amendment provides for a trial by jury in suits at common
law where the value in controversy exceeds $20. These guaranties
leave many questions undecided. L3 yet the Supreme Court has
not said whether jury trial means a trial where the jury is the
dominant factor as it was in the early common law, or where the
attorney is the dominant factor as is the fact in the United States,
or where the judge is the dominant factor as in modern English
trials; probably any one would be constitutional. It has, however,
said that a jury trial is guaranteed only in the greater offenses
and not in petty offenses." It has also held that the essentials of
a jury trial are twelve men,"' impartiality,2" a unanimous verdict,257
supervision by a court,"' and the summoning of jurors from the
vicinage."' It has not as yet interpreted the guaranty of speedy
and public trial, but it will undoubtedly hold that the right to a
public trial is conditional on court room space and good conduct
on the part of spectators and that the guaranty of a speedy trial
means not immediately but as soon as possible.26 The Court, how-
ever, has held that a jury trial is not guaranteed in the case of
petty offenses,2 ' nor in any admiralty court,"2 nor in a probate
court, nor in military tribunals,2" nor in equity courts,2" nor in
disbarment proceedings,265 nor in administrative proceedings,26
254 District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U. S. 63 (1930).
255 Thompson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343 (1898).
256 United States v. Wood, 299 U. S. 123 (1936).
257Springville v. Thomas, 166 U. S. 707 (3897).
258 Quereia v. United States, 289 U. S. 466 (1933).
250 Beavers v. Henkel, 194 U. S. 73 (1904).
260 WILLIS, CoNsTITuToNAL LAW (1936) 550-51.
261 Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540 (1888).
202 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932).
263 Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U. S. 1 (1921).
1e4 Ia re Debs, 158 U. S. 564 (1895).
25 Ex parte Burr, 9 Wheat. 529 (U. S. 1824).
266 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 (1893).
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nor in the case of extraordinary legal remedies,28 nor in tax pro-
ceedings. ' It has not as yet decided whether or not a jury trial
is required in a federal case, in eminent domain proceedings, or in
case of declaratory judgments, or whether a corporation is entitled
to a jury trial. It has, however, held that a jury trial in civil and
criminal cases is a privilege which may be waived.26
The Sixth Amendment guarantees to an accused the right "to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation". This
guaranty is so general that it has been necessary for the Supreme
Court to fill in most of the details. The Court has made it mean
that an indictment must accurately and clearly describe every
ingredient of which an offense is composed so as not only to inform
the court of the facts but to give the accused such notice as to
enable him to make his defense and to lay the foundation for the
defense of double jeopardy."' Thi amendment also contains a
general guaranty of the right of confrontation. The Supreme Court
has made this guaranty safeguard the accused against secret in-
quisitorial methods, and secure him the right of cross examination
and the right to see the witness' face and hear what he says during
the whole of a trial in a felony case,27' but it does not give one the
right to be present at a view of the premises,272 nor the right to
exclude dying declarations or the testimony of witnesses on a former
trial if now dead.27 The guaranty to an accused of the right "to
have the assistance of counsel for his defense" has been made to
mean that an attorney designated cannot decline such an appoint-
ment and that the accused has the privilege of communication and
consultation with his counsel, and that the due process clause in-
cludes this guaranty so as to make it available in state courts.'
267 Wilson v. North Carolina, 169 U. S. 586 (1898); Southern Ry. v. City of
Durham, 266 U. S. 178 (1924).
2M Murray v. Hoboken Land Co., 18 How. 272 (U. S. 1856).
269 Patton v. United States, 281 U. S. 276 (1930).
270 United States v. Cook, 17 Wall. 168 (U. S. 1872); United States v.
Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 (1876); United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255
U. S. 81 (1921).
271 Fieltz v. Mturphy, 201 T. S. 123 (1906) ; Hopt v. People of the Territory
of Utah, 110 U. S. 574 (1884).
272 Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97 (1934).
273 Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S. 237 (1895).
274Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
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The Eighth Amendment has a guaranty against "excessive fines"
and "excessive bail". The Supreme Court has made bail a matter
of discretion, except in the case of higher offenses, permitting such
as will secure the presence of the aceus~d at the trial. 5 The pro-
vision that "cruel and unusual punishment" shall not be inflicted
has been interpreted as forbidding excessive fines,"' but not as
prohibiting death by electricity," ' or by shooting,2 ' or a heavier
punishment for a habitual criminal,2 9 or imprisonment for non-
payment of certain debts."0
Slavery and Involuntary Servitu.le. The Thirteenth Amend-
ment provides "Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject
to their jurisdiction." This is a very important guaranty but its
silences leave unanswered a great many questions. The Supreme
Court has made the amendment apply to the actions of the Federal
Government, of the States, and of individuals; and has made the
amendment self-executing without any legislative action."' It has
made the amendment include protection against peonage and the
Chinese coolie trade ;22 against making a breach of contract a crime,
punishable by compulsory labor;28' and against specific perform-
ance of personal service contracts. But the amendment has been
held not applicable to work made a part of prison discipline,'" to
compulsory service by a sailor for a breach of contract,2"5 to the
compulsion of service by a parent or master of a child or servant,m8
27 United States v. Hamilton, 2 Dall. 17 (U. S. 1795); United States v.
Lawrence, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,577 (C. C. D. C. 1835).
27 Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 (1910).
'
77 In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436 (1890).
7 8 Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130 (1878).
MM2 e0 Donald v. Massachusetts, 180 U. S. 311 (1901).
280 Hill v. United States, 298 U. S. 460 (1936).
281 Hodges v. United States, 203 U. S. 1 (1906).
282 Slaughterhouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1872).
283 Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U. S. 219 (1911).
28 4 Ex parte Karstendick, 93 U. S. 396 (1876).
285 Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U. S. 275 (1897). (Purely historical reasons
underlie this decision.)
286 Clyatt v. United States, 197 U. S. 207 (1905).
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to jury service and work on the highways,217 to compulsory military
service,'2 8 or to deprivation of the ordinary civil rights."9 Whether
or not employees engaged in interstate commerce may be compelled
to continue service has not been definitely settled.29
Ex Post Facto Laws. The original Constitution forbids both the
Federal Government's and the States' passing any ez post facto
law. But the Court limited this guaranty to protection against
criminal legislation only.29' The Court then made penal laws ex
post facto, (1) when an act is made criminal which was innocent
when done, (2) when a crime is made greater than it was when it
was committed, (3) when punishment is made greater than the
punishment prescribed at the time an act was committed, (4) when
the rules of evidence are so changed as to deprive a defendant of
a substantial right, (5) when retrospective qualifications for office
are made which are not proper exercises of police power.2"
Obligation of Contracts. The original Constitution forbids the
States' passing a "law impairing the obligations of contracts".
This language in the original Constitution says so little that the
Supreme Court has had to fill in practically all that has been said
on this subject. The contract clause by its own language applies
only to state action, and the Supreme Court has made it apply
only to the legislative branch of the state governments.293 But the
Court has made the due process clause protect against the impair-
ment of the obligation of contracts so as to give protection against
the Federal Government,2" but in such case evidently only against
Congress.295 It also has made the guaranty in the contract clause
protect both state contracts and private contracts, either with
287 Butler v. Perry, 240 U. S. 328 (1916).
288 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 366 (1918).
289 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883).
2 90 Adair v. United States, 208 U. S. 161 (1908); Wilson v. New, 243 U. S.
332 (1917).
2 91 Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (U. S. 1798).
292 Ibd.; Thovapson v. Utah, 170 U. S. 343 (1898); Ez parte Garland, 4 Wall.
333 (1867); Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S. 189 (1898). It should be noted
that the ex post facto clause is not in general subject to the police power,
taxation, and eminent domain.
293 Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103 (1895).
29 United States v. Northern Pac. By., 256 U. S. 51 (1921).
295 W LLIs, CONSrUUTONAL LAW (1936) 601.
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individuals or other states, 9 ' but not quasi-contracts,2 nor tort
judgments," 8 nor public oce.2" The original clause protects only
the obligation of contracts, but the Supreme Court has made this
include both executed contracts, including grants,"' and executory
contracts.'
Does the Constitution, through the contract clause, protect cor-
porate charters? The Supreme Court might have held that a
corporate charter is not a contract. It has so held in the case of
charters of municipal corporations. °2 However, it has made the
charters of private corporations con;racts, °3 and at first it made
the Constitution protect such contracts against the power of
taxation, the police power, and probably the power of eminent
domain.'" After making this constitutional law, the Court saw
that it had gone too far and began to modify and amend the
Constitution which it had thus created, (1) by a rule of strict
construction,"°' (2) by reading into the contract in charters a
reservation of a power to alter so that there would be no impair-
ment,0 0 and (3) by directly changing the Constitution made by
itself so as to make all charter contracts subject to (a) the power
of eminent domain,"°' and (b) the police power,0 8 except as to
rates and franchises of public utilities."0 0 It is still questionable,
2O0 Sturgis v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122 (U. S. 1819); Green v. Biddle, 8
Wheat. 1 (U. S. 1823).
207 Morey v. Lakeshore Ry., 146 'U. S. 162 -'1892).
29S Louisiana v. Mayer, 109 U. S. 285 (183).
200 Taylor v. Beckum, 178 U. S. 548 (1900).
OO Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (U. S. 1810); New Jersey v. Wilson, 7
Craneh 164 (U. S. 1812) (granting away tax power).
801 Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1 (U. S. 182).
302 Mt. Pleasant v. Beekwith, 100 U. S. 514: (1879).
303 Txustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518 (U. S. 1819).
804Piqua Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369 (U. S. 1853).
805 Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420 (U. S. 1837).
300 Greenwood v. Marginal Freight Co., 105 U. S. 13 (1881).
07 Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685 (1897).
808 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S. 814 (1879); Butcher Co. v. Crescent City
Co., 111 U. S. 746 (1884); Illinois Central R. R. v. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387
(1892); Home B. & L. Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398 (1934); Norman v.
Baltimore & Ohio Ry., 294 U. S. 240 (1935).
309 Now Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light; Co., 115 U. S. 650 (1885).
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however, whether it has made charter contracts subject to the power
of taxation. 10
Where there is not a proper exercise of the police power, the
Court holds that the Constitution makes a destruction of a remedy
on a contract an impairment of a contract," although it holds that
the Constitution permits remedies to be changed."2 Since the
Court extended the due process clause to include protection against
the impairment of the obligation of contracts, it necessarily put
itself in a position where it had to extend the due process clause
to protect against all civil retroactive legislation which is not a
proper exercise of the power of eminent domain, taxation, or police
power. 8 It has not as yet settled the question of whether the
protection against civil retroactive social control applies only
against the legislative branch or all three branches of the govern-
ment; nor has it as yet decided whether or not the Constitution
protects against the operation of changes in the period of the
statute of limitations after debts have been outlawed.
Equality. Section one of the Fourteenth Amendment provides
that "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." The Supreme Court has made
this clause applicable to action by any of the branches of the state
governments, 4 and it has probably made the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment include a guaranty of equality so as to give
people this protection against the Federal Government ;818 but the
guaranty gives no protection against the action of private indi-
viduals.8 6
At first the Court made the equality clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protect the personal liberty of negroes only,1 7 but it
810 Hale v. Iowa, 58 Sup. Ct. 102 (1937).
811 Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535 (U. S. 1867).
812 Terry v. Anderson, 95 U., S. 628 (1877); Watson v. Mercer, 8 Pet. 88
(U. S. 1834).
818 United States v. Heinszen & Co., 206 U. S. 370 (1907) ; Tiaco v. Forbes,
228 U. S. 549 (1913).
814 Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. 278 (1913); Ez part6
Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (1880).
815 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114 (1889) ; Second Employer's Liability
Cases, 223 U. S. 1 (1912).
816 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S. 3 (1883).
817 Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1872).
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has gradually extended the scope of the guaranty until it now
protects the personal liberty of all natural persons including
aliens... and private corporations which are domestic, 19 or engaged
in interstate commerce,"2 or which have been admitted to the
state ;81 but it does not protect corporations not admitted to the
state, unless a state undertakes to impose a condition which would
require the surrender of some interest either of the United States
or of another state. 22
The protection which the Court has made the equality clause
give the persons referred to is protection against class legislation.
In other words, it has made the guaranty one not of the equal
protection of the laws but of the protection of equal laws. 2 ' The
Constitution thus created permits classification for the police
power, the power of taxation, and for eminent domain according
to persons,"' geography, 11 objects,"' occupations,27 and kinds of
taxes."2
The equality clause does not, according to the Supreme Court,
require uniformity. However, the original Constitution requires
uniformity for duties, imposts, and excises; but the Court has made
this requirement more or less innocuous by limiting it to geographi-
cal uniformity 28
Due Process of Law. The Fifth Amendment forbids the Federal
Government's and the Fourteenth Amendment forbids any State's
818 Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138 (1914) ; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S.
33 (1915).
810 Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. Ry., 118 U. S. 394 (1886).
820 Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U. S. 1 (1877).
8 21 Herdon v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. By., 218 U. S. 135 (1910).
822 Atlantic Refining Co. v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 58 Sup. Ct. 75 (1937);
WILLrs, CONSTITuTioAL1 LAW (1936) 576-79.
832 Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 (1885); Pembina Consolidated Silver
M. & M. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181 (1888).
824 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537 (1896) ; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S.
197 (1923).
3253Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 (18:35); Kansas City Southern Ry. v.
Road Improvement Dist. No. 3, 266 U. S. 379 (1924).
-26 Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678 (1888); Roberts & Schaefer Co. v.
Emmerson, 271 U. S. 50 (1926).
327 Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 (1898).
828 Hart Refineries v. Harmon, 278 U. S. 499 (1929).
828 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41 (1900).
[VOL. 23
1938] THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPEME COUIT 205
depriving any person "of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law". The Supreme Court has done some of its most
mysterious and marvelous work in constitution-making in connec-
tion with these clauses. At first it made these clauses apply only
to legal procedure and the clause in the Fourteenth Amendment
was held to apply only to the protection of negroes 0 and not to
include other constitutional guaranties. But through the years the
Court has more and more extended the scope of the clauses.
For one thing, it has extended due process until now the guaranty
of due process of law includes the other constitutional guaranties
of protection against impairment of the obligation of contracts,"
equality,"3 2 freedom of speech and of the press,' religious free-
dom, 34 right to have counsel,' to confront witnesses," and to
know the nature of the accusation,"3 7 the right of assembly," the
protection against cruel and unusual punishment,339 and against
double jeopardy, 4 ' and perhaps the guaranty of a public trial.'
The Court has made due process of law include so many other con-
stitutional guaranties that it might well extend it until it should
include all of them and there is a possibility that sometime in the
future this may be done.
For another thing, the Court has extended the protection of due
process as to legal procedure so as to protect all natural persons
and even corporations" and in so doing, except against legislative
bodies, certain executive officers, and in matters of trifling im-
portance,""3 it has made it guarantee: (1) notice sufficient to inform
a person of the time and place of the trial and the tribunal before
830 Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1872).
831 United States v. Northern Pae. Ry., 256 U. S. 51 (1921).
332 McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27 (1904).
333 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697 (1931).
334 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923).
835 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
830 Snyder v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97 (1934).
837 Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385 (1926).
838 DeJonge v. State of Oregon, 57 Sup. Ct. 255 (1937).
839 MeElvaine v. Brush, 142 U. S. 155 (1891).
340 Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. State of Minnesota, 218 U. S. 57 (1910).
3 Gaines v. Washington, 277 U. S. 81 (1828).
42 Minneapolis By. v. Beckwith, 129 U. S. 26 (1889).
343 WzLis, CoNsTr.uTioxAI LAW (1936) 662-63.
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whom a claim is to be made, to apprize him of the nature of the
cause against him, and to afford him sufficient opportunity to pre-
pare and make his answer;" ' (2) a reasonable opportunity to be
heard in cases involving the police power, 4" the power of eminent
domain, and taxation where taxes are levied according to value or
by local assessment;3. (3) an impartial tribunal,4T and where
questions of law are involved, a judicial tribunal;.48 and (4) an
orderly course of procedure according to what the Supreme Court
thinks reasonable. This last guaranty requires a review by a court
over an administrative tribunal's 3xercise of judicial power, 49
mental competence of judges and jurors,5 0 freedom from mob
domination,"' presence of witnesses, a public trial,"5 2 and counsel
and opportunity for counsel to prepare the case.3"3
The Supreme Court has extended due process to the requirement
of jurisdiction as a condition precedent to the exercise of govern-
mental powers. The Court has not as :yet made clear what it requires
as the basis of jurisdiction. It has played with the various explana-
tions of physical power, consent, submission, presence, and grant
of power; but apparently no one of these, with the possible excep-
tion of the last, is sufficient at all times and under all circum-
stances." 4 For judicial jurisdiction over persons, it has required
personal or constructive service of process within territorial
boundaries,"' or outside territorial. boundaries on one whose
domicil is within the territorial boundaries;"' and over things,
substituted service by publication of notice."'T For jurisdiction for
344 Rollor v. Holly, 176 U. S. 398 (1900).
345 Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U. S. 490 (1935).
$40 Central of Georgia By. v. Wright, 207 U. S. 127 (1907).
347 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510 (1927).
348 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932).
349 Alton R. R. v. Unitea States, 287 U. S. 229 (1932).
30 Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U. S. 167 (1912).
351 Moore v. Demsey, 261 U. S. 86 (1923).
352 Gaines v. Washington, 277 U. S. 81 (1928).
8 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45 (1932).
354 WILLIs, CONSTITuToNAL LAw (1936) 1379.
N Earl v. McVeigh, 91 U. S. 503 (1875) ; Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U. S. 13
(1928).
356 Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 4:31 (1932).
57 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877).
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taxation it has required situs for property taxes in the case of
land& and in the case of tangibles, except where the unit rule
applies;.59 and domicil in the case of tangibles even though evi-
denced by tangibles, except where the unit rule applies and where
a business situs has been acquired. 6 ° For inheritance taxes the
same requirements have been established as for property taxes, situs
in the case of land3  and tangibles,36 ' and domicil in the case of
intangibles,68 except in case of foreign intangibles evidenced by
tangibles.'" For other excise taxes, there is required the grant of
a privilege by the taxing agency ;.. for incomes taxes domicil,"' or
situs,"6 ' or nationality is required. 6 For jurisdiction for divorce
it has required either domicil of both parties or jurisdiction over
the matrimonial status.69
The most wonderful work of the Supreme Court, finally, has been
the extension of due process to matters of substance. This occurred
in the eighties, very largely through the influence of Justice Field.
Meanwhile no change in the language in the formal amendments
occurred. The Supreme Court merely made due process of law
thenceforth apply to matters of substance where before it had held
that it did not apply to such matters. The meaning of this new
constitutional provision made by the Court is that all social control,
either by the states or the United States, is unconstitutional unless
it is reasonable in the judgment of the Supreme Court. The Court
will say it is reasonable if it is a proper exercise of the police
power, or of the power of taxation, or of the power of eminent
358itherspoon v. Dungan, 4 Wall. 210 (U. S. 1866).
359Union :Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U. S. 194 (1905);
Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18 (1891).
360 Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U. S. 586 (1930); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio,
166 U. S. 185 (1897); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U. S.
395 (1907).
361 'hode Island v. Doughton, 272 U. S. 567 (1926).
362 Prick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925).
863 Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U. S. 1 (1928).
36Burnet v. Brooks, 288 U. S. 378 (1933).
365 United States v. Bennett, 232 U. S. 299 (1914).
366 Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U. S. 276 (1932).
867 People v. Graves, 57 Sup. Ct. 237 (1937).
(68 Cook v. Tait, 265 U. S. 47 (1924).
869 Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U. S. 155 (1901); Haddock v. Haddock, 201
U. S. 562 (1906).
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domain and the method adopted by government bears some sub-
stantial relation to the end to be accomplished. The Supreme Court,
in other words, in each case balances personal liberty on the one
hand against these forms of social control on the other hand. If
it thinks personal liberty the more important, it declares the social
control unconstitutional;8. if it decides social control the more
important and that the method bears some substantial relation to
the end, it will decide in favor of social control. 7
It is a proper exercise of the police power if it is for the protec-
tion of a paramount social interest. Such social interests are bodily
health,"' property,7  physical safety,"74 certain freedom of con-
tract,"7 5 livelihood," ' general economic progress, 7 the protection of
natural resources," or human resources,"' or the individual life,"
the prevention of fraud,"3 aesthetic feelings,"3 political institu-
tions," 3 general morals,' general political progress,' domestic and
religious institutions,8 8 or general cultural progress.3 It is not as
yet a proper exercise of the police power to make a homogenous
race by requiring the use of the English language8 or by required
attendance at public schools.8 There is no substantial relation to
370 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60 (1917).
871 Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U. S. 188 (1925).
872 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887).
873 Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U. S. 313 (1911).
374 Erie R. Rt. v. Board of Public Utilities Commission, 254 U. S. 394 (1921).
875 Allgoyor v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578 (1897).
878 Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590 (1917).
877Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52 (1915); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113
(1876).
878 Miller v. Schoene, 276 U. S. 272 (1928).
879 Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200 (1927).
880 Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104 (1911); New York Central
R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188 (1917).
881 McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539 (1909).
882 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926).
883 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U. S. 356 (1918).
384 Booth v. Illinois, 184 U. S. 425 (1902).
8 People of New York v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63 (1928).
8 Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299 (1896).
887 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365 (1926).
88 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923).
880 Pierce v. Society of the Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925).
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the end to be accomplished in requiring the ownership of drug
stores to be by pharmacists where the end is the protection of
health."9 At first the Supreme Court could find no substantial
relation between bodily health and the regulation of hours of labor"9 '
or the regulation of minimum wages,"'2 but now it is able to find
such a relation both in the case of hours of labor8" and in the case
of minimum wages."
It is a proper exercise of the power of taxation when taxation
is for a public purpose rather than for a private purpose.89" ' There
is such a public purpose in the case of governmental functions,
including schools and pensions for teachers, 9 ' and the operation of
public utilities8" or in the case of subsidies for the benefit of fire and
famine sufferers where the number benefited is large,898 or where
private enterprise is inadequate and there is sufficient public need 99
Taxation for a private individual is unconstitutional if done
directly, but it may be done indirectly through the form of exemp-
tions ;4"0 and the Supreme Court apparently puts no limitations on
the spending power of Congress."'
It is a proper exercise of the power of eminent domain when it
is for a public use and for just compensation, no matter what kind
of property is taken." 2 At first the Supreme Court required a
physical taking. 8 and use by the public,4' but now it holds that
there is a taking when any of the incidents of ownership are taken4 5
8 9OLiggett Company v. Baldridge, 278 U. S. 105 (1928).
9 1 Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (1905).
892 Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525 (1923).
893 Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U. S. 426 (1917).
394West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 57 Sup. Ct. 578 (1937).
895 Loan Ass'n v. Topelka, 20 Wall. 655 (U. S. 1874).
896 United States v. Hall, 98 U. S. 343 (1878).
897 Standard Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 275 U. S. 504 (1927).
898 Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 57 Sup. Ct. 868 (1937).
899 Milheim v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement Dist., 262 U. S. 710 (1923).
400 Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U. S. 180 (1921).
40 1 lMassachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
402 Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U. S. 685 (1897).
4 03 Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166 (U. S. 1871).
4 0 4 Hairston v. Danville & Western Ry., 208 U. S. 598 (1908).
4 0 Strickley v. Highland Boy Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527 (1906).
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and where the taking will be useful or beneficial to the public.!0 0
But the due process clause protects against the taking of private
property for a private use07 or for a public use without just com-
pensation.""3
In the future the Supreme Court may find other social interests,
other public purposes, and other public uses, in which case further
social control will be constitutional; or it may throw out some of
the social interests, public purposes, and public uses which it now
recognizes, in which case individuals will be guaranteed more
personal liberty. In this way the Supreme Court has arrogated to
itself the power to draw the line between personal liberty and sub-
stantive social control and to determine how much such social con-
trol shall be permitted in the United States.
In General. There are found in thp original Constitution and the
formal amendments various other constitutional guaranties and limi-
tations, which have been interpreted and rewritten by the Supreme
Court so as to be made to mean what it thinks they ought to mean.
Among these may be named the interstate privileges and immunities
clause which has already been considered in connection with citizen-
ship and suffrage and which not only protects the personal liberty
of individuals but, as expanded, decreases the powers of the state
governments and thereby changes our dual form of government. 9
Other provisions which have received similar treatment include the
provision against the repudiation of debts in Article VI and in
the Fourteenth Amendment; the pro.vision against discrimination
in the matter of suffrage on account of race or sex in the Fifteenth
and Nineteenth Amendments, which the Court has held do not
prevent qualifications for voting', 0 the provision forbidding the
Federal Government to tax exports and the provision forbidding
the states to tax either exports or imports, which the Court has
interpreted as applying only to goods going to or coming from a
foreign country;.' the provision requiring capitation and other
400 Clark v. Nash, 198 U. S. 361 (1905).
407 Missouri Pac. R. R. v. Nebraska, 164 U. S. 403 (1896).
08 Searl v. School Dist., 133 U. S. 553 (1890).
409 Colegate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404 (1935).
41"0 McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1 (1892).
11 Pairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283 (1901); Woodruff v. Parham,
8 Wall. 123 (U. S. 1858).
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direct taxes to be apportioned, which were first held not to include
income taxes' but which were later held to include such taxes ;
and the provision against diminishing judicial salaries, which the
Court has held makes it unconstitutional to require the judges to
pay an income tax.41 4
While the foregoing guaranties and limitations and the work of
the Supreme Court directly protect personal liberty, other consti-
tutional doctrines have a similar but indirect effect and the work
of the Court has added to the effect which the doctrines would
otherwise have. Thus, the doctrine of separation of powers has the
direct effect or purpose of delimiting the powers of the various
branches of government, but it has the indirect effect of protecting
the personal liberty of individuals, because as the Court holds that
any given branch of government does not have power it thereby
protects personal liberty. In the same way our dual form of govern-
ment has the same effect. The purpose of this doctrine is directly
to delimit the powers of the state governments on the one hand
and of the Federal Government on the other; but indirectly, when
a power is denied to either the Federal Government or the states,
it has the effect of protecting personal liberty. As a matter of fact,
it almost seems that when the states are acting but the Federal
Government is not acting, the Supreme Court has denied state power
in order to protect personal liberty;41 and when the Federal
Government is acting but the states are not acting, it has denied
federal power in order to protect personal liberty. 6 What is true
of these doctrines is more or less true of the other great constitu-
tional doctrines: the supremacy of the Supreme Court, sovereignty,
amendability of the Constitution, and universal citizenship and
suffrage.
From this survey it is very clear that the protection of personal
liberty and the permission of social control is just what the Supreme
Court says it shall be. A great part of the Constitution on this sub-
ject has been written by the Court alone. Any parts of the Consti-
tution on this subject written by others, it has rewritten. The
412 Springer v. United States, 102 U. S. 586 (1880).
41 8 Pollock v. Farmers L. & T. Co, 157 U. S. 429 (1895).
414 Evans v. Gore, 253 U. S. 245 (1920).
415 Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557 (1886); Buck v.
Kuykendall, 267 U. S. 307 (1925).
416 United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936).
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guaranties and limitations in the original Constitution and the
formal amendments do not mean what those who originally wrote
them thought they meant nor what the ordinary layman might think
they mean, but they mean just what the Court has decided that
they shall mean. In other words the doctrine of the protection of
personal liberty against social control as it now stands is practically
entirely the work of the United States Supreme Court.
CONcLUSIcn
So far as the rest of the Constitution is concerned, the work of
the Supreme Court does not bulk as large as it does in connection
with personal liberty and social control, but even here the work of
the Court bulks larger than that of all other agencies of constitu-
tion making combined. The Constitut;ion may be divided into four
parts: the original Constitution, the formal amendments, an un-
written Constitution, and the Constitution made by the Supreme
Court. The unwritten Constitution includes the political Constitu-
tion made by Congress, as exemplified in the development of the
cabinet and commission systems, and perhaps a rule against a third
term for the President. The original Constitution includes the
doctrine of separation of powers and the doctrine of amendability
of the Constitution with some materials for the doctrine of
sovereignty, the doctrine of a dual form- of government and the
doctrine of protection of personal liberty against social control.
The formal amendments include the doctrine of universal citizenship
and suffrage and the protection of personal liberty against social
control. That part of the Constitution made by the Supreme Court
includes the doctrine of sovereignty, the doctrine of a dual form of
government, and the doctrine of the supremacy of the Supreme Court.
In addition, that part of the Constitution made by the Supreme
Court includes all the changes which the Supreme Court has made
in the other constitutional law doctrines. Where it has practically
rewritten a doctrine like the doctrine of protection of personal
liberty against social control, it includes the whole doctrine. Where
it has only added to or modified other doctrines, it includes only
such additions and modifications. When the work of the Supreme
Court is stated in this form, it is easy to see that the Supreme Court
has been the supreme constitution-maker. It has been a perpetual
constitutional convention. It practically never sits without making
some part of our Constitution. The part of the Constitution made
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by the Supreme Court is harder to find because it is scattered
through 302 volumes of reports of its decisions, but when it is found
it is found to include all of the things which have been enumerated
in this article. The part of the Constitution made by the Supreme
Court is, therefore, more than one-half of our present Constitution.
The Constitution is truly what the Supreme Court says that it is.
In making the Constitution the Supreme Court has performed a
necessary and triumphant function. It is appalling to think of
what would have happened if the Court had done nothing of this
sort. We can be sure that we should have witnessed revolutions,
the break down of democrary, and the abandonment of the Con-
stitution. It is inconceivable that a better Constitution could have
been obtained in any other way. The Court has made the Consti-
tution what a growing, changing civilization has demanded. It
has made our fundamental law not an anchor holding us back to
a stagnant past but a rudder guiding us into an expanding and
unfolding future. In creating it the Supreme Court has created
the greatest and best thing on the North American continent, and
"the most wonderful work" not "struck off at one time" but struck
off during the last one hundred and fifty years "by the brain and
purpose of man".
Except for what it has done in connection with due process as
a matter of substance and in connection with the protection of cor-
porations against economic social control, the work of the Supreme
Court is not subject to criticism. The chief criticism of the Court
must be in connection with its determination of questions of social
policy under the due process clause as a matter of substance -a
legislative function. Its extension of the due process clause to
matters of substance and its usurpation of the power thereby given
to itself was undoubtedly originally a mistake. Probably now this
mistake should be corrected. The only feasible way to correct it is
by an amendment to the United States Constitution providing that
the judical power of the United States shall not extend to such
matters. Where the rest of the work of the Supreme Court is sub-
ject to criticism the cure should be found not in an amendment to
the Constitution but in waiting for the Court itself to correct its
own mistakes. Even if the Supreme Court has sometimes apparently
been power-mad in its restraint of the Federal Government and the
state governments for the protection of private business, in con-
nection with the doctrine of separation of powers and the doctrine
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of our dual form of government, it will be better to allow it to
make its own corrections rather than to take from the Supreme
Court jurisdiction to decide controversies between the states and
the nation on the one hand and between the various branches of
the national government on the other hand- a judicial function.
